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There are a host of fascinating philosophical issues that concern our 
understanding of the self, its relation to the first personal perspective, and 
its connection to the structure and content of conscious experience.  
 
These issues connect to work in the philosophy of language involving the 
nature of de se content and the role of perspective. They concern the role of 
indexicals in broader philosophical theories and the nature of the semantic 
content that indexicals contribute to our linguistic and conceptual 
representations. Further metaphysical and epistemological questions arise 
when we ask whether we need first personal content or other essentially 
perspectival philosophical tools to adequately present certain features of 
the world to ourselves.   
 
Ideally, we use the semantics to capture relevant metaphysical and 
epistemic structure. A popular philosophical thesis holds that we employ 
the semantics of “I”, often described as the “essential indexical,” to capture 
distinctive metaphysical and epistemic features of the first personal 
perspective needed for our expressions to have de se content. Capturing this 
content allows us to use indexical expressions to represent perspectival 
features of reality, in particular, features concerning our selves and our 
relationship to other parts of the world.  
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Recent work by Herman Cappelen and Josh Dever attacks this idea.1 
Cappelen and Dever focus their attack on the philosophical significance of 
the first personal perspective, arguing that there is no deep philosophical 
contribution made to our understanding of the world by the use of 
perspectival or indexical notions. They argue that phrases like “essential 
indexicality” and “irreducibly de se attitudes” are not well defined, and deny 
that theories of indexicality and perspective are doing important 
explanatory work in philosophy.  
 
One of the important lessons I draw from Cappelen and Dever’s work is 
that we need to look harder at the implicit metaphysical and 
epistemological commitments made in various discussions of the essential 
indexical. 2 Their work shows that deep and difficult philosophical issues 
about the self and the first personal perspective are not captured merely by 
developing the semantics for indexical expressions such as “I” and “now”. 
 
However, the limitations of our semantic tools do not imply that we can 
simply dispense with perspectival philosophical assessments of ourselves 
and of the world. There are important philosophical issues about how we 
are to understand the nature of reality and the way we understand 
ourselves that involve the exploration of the first personal perspective.3 
Even if we work out the semantic issues about perspective and indexicality 
to our satisfaction, theories of the first person and the self are 
philosophically rich and productive—because the philosophical action is 
elsewhere. That is: the action isn’t in the semantics. It’s in the metaphysics, 
mind, and epistemology. 
 
Below, I’ll discuss Cappelen and Dever’s arguments against the essential 
indexical, and suggest that we can better understand the de se by employing 
the subjective mode of presentation (or, if one’s ontology permits it, by 
defending an abundant ontology of perspectival personal properties or 
facts). Then I’ll present some reasons for thinking there is an important role 
for philosophical discussions of the first personal perspective when we are 
thinking about empathy, rational deference, and self-understanding. 
  
 
The Inessential Indexical 
The literature on the de se has grown up largely around two central 
examples, given by John Perry and David Lewis, respectively: 
 
                                                             
1 Herman Cappelen and Josh Dever, The Inessential Indexical. The book is essential reading 
for anyone interested in the philosophical questions concerning the nature and 
representation of the self. 
2 Although I’m focusing on Cappelen and Dever in this paper, there are many other 
important contributions made to the philosophy of language literature on this topic, such as 
those by Egan 2006, Ismael 2007, Ninan 2013, Stanley 2011, Titelbaum 2013, etc. 
3 I develop my views about the importance of the subjective perspective in Paul 2014 and 
Paul 2015a, 2015b, 2015c. 
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[Shopper] “I once followed a trail of sugar on a supermarket floor, 
pushing my cart down the aisle on one side of a tall counter and back 
down the aisle on the other, seeking the shopper with the torn sack to 
tell him he was making a mess. With each trip around the counter, the 
trail became thicker. But I seemed unable to catch up. Finally it 
dawned on me. I was the shopper I was trying to catch... I believed at 
the outset that the shopper with a torn sack was making a mess. And I 
was right. But I didn’t believe that I was making a mess. That seems to 
be something I came to believe.” (Perry 1979, p.3) 
 
[Two Gods] “Consider the case of the two gods. They inhabit a certain 
possible world, and they know exactly which world it is. Therefore 
they know every proposition that is true at their world. Insofar as 
knowledge is a propositional attitude, they are omniscient. Still I can 
imagine them to suffer ignorance: neither one knows which of the two 
he is. They are not exactly alike. One lives on top of the tallest 
mountain and throws down manna; the other lives on top of the 
coldest mountain and throws down thunderbolts. Neither one knows 
whether he lives on the tallest mountain or on the coldest mountain; 
nor whether he throws manna or thunderbolts. Surely their 
predicament is possible. (The trouble might perhaps be that they have 
an equally perfect view of every part of their world, and hence cannot 
identify the perspectives from which they view it.)”   (Lewis 1979, p. 
520) 
 
 
We can agree that “I” is playing an indexical role in these examples, and that 
some sort of discovery is made when Perry discovers he is the shopper 
making the mess or one of the gods (say, Zeus) discovers he is the god on 
the tallest mountain. The question is whether this means there is a proper 
subset of “I”–involving indexicals that are somehow special or more 
essential than other semantic tools, and whether this sort of indexicality is 
philosophically distinctive. Is “I” the essential indexical? 
 
With characteristic style, Cappelen and Dever argue that it is not. They 
argue for this by showing, over and over again, how the examples involving 
“I”-indexicality are instances of the familiar phenomenon of generic 
opacity. That is, they show how examples like Shopper, which have been 
interpreted as involving discoveries of special, distinctive “I”-facts, should 
instead be interpreted as involving discoveries stemming from the way that 
co-referential referring expressions cannot be substituted salva veritate in 
action-explanation contexts. 
 
The central move is brought out clearly by Cappelen and Dever’s 
Superman/Clark Kent example, a modification of Shopper: 
 
[Superman/Clark Kent] Pushing my cart down the aisle I was looking 
for CK to tell him he was making a mess. I kept passing by Superman, 
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but couldn’t find CK. Finally, I realized, Superman was CK. I believed 
at the outset that CK was making a mess. And I was right. But I didn’t 
believe that Superman was making a mess. That seems to be 
something that I came to believe. And when I came to believe that, I 
stopped looking around and I told Superman to clean up after himself. 
My change in beliefs seems to explain my change in behavior.  
(Cappelen and Dever 2013, p.33) 
 
It seems that we have just the same structure here as in Perry’s original 
example. If so, there is no so-called “essential” contribution made by the 
indexicality in Shopper. There is a change in belief. But there’s no special 
first-personal, essential indexicality involved. Rather, Perry’s case is just an 
“I”-involving example of a familiar phenomenon: the failure of substitution 
in certain contexts. Cappelen and Dever’s discussion of Lewis’s Two Gods, 
in addition to drawing out some very interesting and subtle assumptions 
that are particular to Lewis’s picture, suggests that the same sort of failure 
of substitution is occurring there. 
 
The critical discussion of Shopper and Two Gods forces us to re-think the 
nature of our implicit philosophical commitments in discussions of the de 
se. As I’ve noted, I’m very sympathetic to Cappelen and Dever’s view that 
these commitments deserve more scrutiny than they’ve usually received: 
They successfully show that semantics alone isn’t enough to support 
philosophical theories of the first personal perspective. 
 
This does not mean, however, that the first personal perspective is 
philosophically uninteresting. Theses involved in, for example, 
philosophical theories of the nature of the self, first personal models of 
causal reasoning and decision-making, explanatory models of moral 
psychology, and utility assessments for social choice theory, require 
substantive underpinnings in metaphysics and epistemology. Looking to 
philosophy of language and in particular, to indexicality to explain all that is 
philosophically distinctive about the first person is looking in all the wrong 
places.   
 
 
Metaphysical facts about the self  
If you are interested in the metaphysical and epistemological structure of 
first personal experience and the self, you should look to related debates in 
metaphysics. In particular, it seems natural to look to discussions of time 
and temporal experience that focus on the indexicality of “now” and the 
metaphysical nature of the present. 
 
A.N. Prior famously illustrated the irreducibility of tensed expressions to 
tenseless ones: 
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“One says, e.g. “Thank goodness that’s over!”, and not only is this, 
when said, quite clear without any date appended, but it says 
something which it is impossible that any use of a tenseless copula 
with a date should convey. It certainly doesn’t mean the same as, e.g. 
“Thank goodness the date of the conclusion of that thing is Friday, 
June 15, 1954, ” even if it be said then. (Nor, for that matter, does it 
mean “Thank goodness the conclusion of that thing is 
contemporaneous with this utterance.” Why should anyone thank 
goodness for that?)” (Prior 1959, p. 17) . 
 
Now, in contemporary metaphysics of time, such irreducibility is 
uncontroversial. The focus in current work is not on the translation or 
reduction of tensed expressions into tenseless ones. Rather, the debate is 
over whether temporal reality (or sometimes, fundamental temporal reality) 
includes “tensed” properties of nowness, pastness, and futurity in addition 
to “tenseless” relations of earlier than, later than, and simultaneous with 
(Paul 2010). The question is whether these tensed properties exist, and 
whether differences in our use of language mark a metaphysical difference 
between tensed and tenseless properties.   
 
On a permissive metaphysics of temporal properties, I can have nowness 
properties (I’m presenting a paper now) as well as tenseless properties (at 
3:30pm on January 6th, 2016, I present my paper). To have a full 
understanding of my temporal properties, I need to grasp my tensed 
properties as well as my tenseless ones. Connecting back to the debate 
about “I’”-involving indexicals, we could do a version of this with personal 
properties. To have a full understanding of my self-involving properties, I 
need to grasp my personal properties as well as my impersonal ones. This is 
a natural way to treat the structure of reality as metaphysically rich enough 
to ground perspectival claims. 
 
On this proposal, the source of the perspectivality in Shopper involves the 
metaphysical difference between impersonal facts (or impersonal 
properties, or whatever your favorite metaphysical, nonlinguistic kind of 
entity is involved here) and personal facts (properties).4 So the interesting 
issue here involves the existence of perspectival, personal facts, not 
something special and essential about mere indexicality. 
 
So, what Perry discovers when it dawns on him that he is the shopper 
making the mess is a perspectival fact; he knew that there existed an 
impersonal fact concerning a shopper who had the property of making a 
mess. What he discovers is a new personal (perspectival) fact: he is the one 
exemplifying the property of making a mess.  
 
                                                             
4 Cappelen and Dever mention in a footnote that Andy Egan suggested a similar point in 
conversation, but they do not develop the idea. 
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On this view, “Someone is making a mess” picks out an impersonal fact, 
while “I am making a mess” picks out a personal fact, a fact that is no less 
real than the other objectively existing facts that ground the mental states 
of a conscious individual. The impersonal facts and the personal facts are 
different, equally real, kinds of facts. This move involves a somewhat 
permissive ontology on the face of it, but there are various further reductive 
techniques one might employ in order to minimize the ontological 
commitments. This is familiar territory.  
 
Alternatively, if you want to reject this sort of permissive ontology (I’m 
inclined to reject it), you might argue that there are no such personal facts, 
but there are personal relations of grasping or “knowing in a new way” 
various impersonal facts. This is just a preference about which kinds of 
entities you are allowing into your ontology. Perhaps you think epistemic 
relations, not nonlinguistic facts, ground the perspectival/nonperspectival 
distinction.  
 
The epistemic view suggests that the way we should think about the 
essential indexical cases involves a standard distinction in the philosophy of 
mind between the descriptive mode of presentation and the subjective 
mode of presentation. (This fits well with Cappelen and Dever’s argument 
that the indexicality involved is just a species of opacity.) The appeal to the 
subjective mode of presentation is familiar from extant discussion of the 
knowledge problem: before she leaves her black and white room, Jackson’s 
Mary might know the propositions about what it is like for her to see red 
under one mode, the mode that presents these propositions to her in terms 
of the scientific facts about her mental states and other dispositions. But 
when she leaves her room and sees red for the first time, she is presented 
with the relevant facts in a new way, and learns what it is like to see red 
under the subjective mode of presentation.5  
 
On this view, we should think of Perry, as he shops, as knowing that 
someone is making a mess under only one mode of presentation. But when 
he discovers that it is he who is making the mess, he recognizes the same 
fact or proposition but under a new mode of presentation, a subjective 
mode.  
 
So, just like there’s a distinctive way to understand what it’s like to see red 
involving the subjective mode of presentation of propositions about red 
experience, there’s a distinctive way to understand what it’s like to be me 
involving the subjective mode of presentation of propositions about an 
individual. Call this the de se mode of presentation. We can use this to 
understand Perry’s Shopper case. Just like a person can discover a new way 
to grasp what it’s like to see red when he has a retinal operation and sees 
red for the first time, he can discover a new way to grasp the proposition 
that someone is making a mess when he discovers that he is the source of 
                                                             
5 Jackson 1982, Lewis 1988, Loar 1990. 
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the mess. On this approach, the distinctions between modes of 
presentation, especially the important and distinctive roles of (various sorts 
of) subjective modes, are what ground the perspectival semantics.   
 
We can do something similar with Lewis’s Two Gods. Lewis’s view is that to 
believe a property-content is to self-ascribe the content. So when Zeus 
needs to know whether he is the god living on the tallest mountain, what 
Zeus needs to do is to knowledgeably self-ascribe a particular content. 
 
Cappelen and Dever give a lovely assessment of Lewis’s view here, showing 
how Lewis’s approach is motivated by his larger commitments to 
propositions as sets of worlds and individuals as sets of properties across 
worlds, as well as Lewis’s preference for describing worlds qualitatively.6 
They argue that: 
 
“Lewis presents another kind of argument in favor of Essential 
Indexicality. He gives an informational puzzle, asking what sort of 
information could be gained by one of the two gods when that god 
learns his location. He then proposes a specific kind of perspectival de 
se content to solve this puzzle—mental state contents are properties/ 
centered worlds, rather than propositions. This content is perspectival 
because it delivers truth conditions not absolutely, but only relative to 
a choice of agent/center. Lewis’s … solution to his informational 
puzzle proceeds by combining his novel theory of properties-as-
                                                             
6 I admit to puzzlement about why we should embrace Lewis’s view that propositions are 
sets of worlds and individuals are sets of properties across worlds. For Lewis himself, it 
makes sense. This is because Lewis approaches this entire question through the lens of his 
reductive approach to modality, where we have a particular sort of ontology of possibilia, we 
reduce necessity and possibility to classes of possible worlds, we maximize reductive 
simplicity and strength, and we aim to reduce as much as possible. This is Lewis’s central 
motivation behind taking propositions to be sets of worlds, for taking properties to be sets of 
individuals across worlds, and then for moving to mental state contents as centered worlds. 
So, because of his commitment to these reductive theses, Lewis starts big and winnows 
down. But if you don’t share all of Lewis’s reductive goals, why endorse all his machinery?  
 
Note that the support for the reductive thesis does not stem merely from a commitment to 
modeling using possibilia (you can like possible world semantics just fine and reject the 
reductive commitments). And I don’t see Lewis’s machinery as giving us a natural approach 
to a theory of truth and meaning once it’s been divested of its reductive motivations. It’s 
unnatural as a theory of properties and as a theory of individuals: we can model propositions 
as worlds and model properties as sets of individuals across worlds for some purposes, but 
why take the Lewisian view that properties are sets of individuals across worlds? It’s 
unnatural as a theory of propositions: why think that propositions are sets of worlds? These 
extra claims can be motivated by Lewisian commitments to a certain way of building one’s 
ontology, again, they were well-motivated for Lewis himself, because they stemmed from his 
broad commitment to reducing modality to possibilia and his modal realism. But these are 
fairly idiosyncratic methodological commitments, and they get more idiosyncratic if we 
reject modal realism and shift to a view where we reduce necessity and possibility to ersatz 
entities. Since I don’t embrace this part of Lewis’s approach to ontology, I’ve never been 
motivated to accept these other features of his preferred approach. It’s not clear to me why 
others do. 
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contents with a specific view of the cognitive role of those contents—
that to believe a property-content is to self-ascribe the content. The 
role of self-ascription is little emphasized either by Lewis or in the 
subsequent literature. But the work of solving the informational 
puzzle rests entirely on the self-ascription leg of the proposal, as can be 
seen by the fact that equivalent solutions can easily be given by  
combining other theories of content (such as possible-worlds content) 
with analogous attitudes such as self-believing.” 
 
 
So the important work is being done by self-ascription. My response is to 
suggest that we understand self-ascription along the same lines as my 
response to Perry. If we agree that Lewis needs an explicit account of self-
ascription (and that he can’t get it indirectly, or on the cheap, via 
functionalism), this fits very naturally with a need for distinctive modes of 
subjective presentation.7 In particular, self-ascription might be what is 
involved when one stands in the subjective mode of presentation to the set 
of properties in W that is the individual in W.  
 
Very roughly: as Cappelen and Dever point out, for Lewis, to hold an 
attitude involving a property-content C is to self-ascribe that attitude. So 
we need a substantive account of self-ascription to understand what’s really 
going on here. One natural way I see to go (without worrying too much if 
Lewis himself would go this way), is to say that to self-ascribe, and in 
particular to self-ascribe an attitude involving a property-content C, 
involves standing in the subjective mode of presentation to property-
content C. 
 
If we assume that individuals are sets of properties, when Zeus discovers 
that he is the god on the tallest mountain in W, he discovers that he is a 
particular set of properties in W. Likewise, when Zeus discovers that he is 
the one hurling down manna from on top of the mountain, what he 
discovers is that he should self-ascribe a content, that is, he discovers the 
unique set that he is. This is a substantive discovery, much like discovering 
what it is like to see red when seeing red for the first time. What Zeus 
discovers is which distinctive set defines him. And once he discovers which 
unique set he is, he stands in a distinctive subjective mode of presentation, 
the de se mode of presentation, to the property-content defined by that set, 
the Zeus-set. In sum: Zeus is subjectively presented with the property-
content defined by the unique set that he is.   
 
(On a more permissive ontology, not Lewis’s and not mine, we could say 
that self-ascription follows when Zeus discovers a special metaphysical fact, 
the perspectival fact that he is the one hurling manna. Here, the important 
move is the self-ascription of a property involving this perspectival fact.)  
                                                             
7 Note that Lewis 1988 effectively endorses modes of subjective presentation in his reply to 
the knowledge argument. 
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Just a few more remarks on the idea I’m sketching here. First, if you make a 
move like this, you can say that the de se involves knowing-how. On a 
broadly Lewisian picture, this is the idea that Zeus gains a new ability rather 
than learning new information (i.e., rather than learning new facts) when 
he self-ascribes.  
 
But second, there’s going to be an element of the de re here, because purely 
qualitative modes of presentation won’t be good enough, not for the Lewis 
case nor for the Perry case. I already built that in with the comments about 
“the unique set” or “the particular set” above. Having the “that’s-me” or a 
“sense of myself” experience presented to you isn’t enough for de se content, 
you’ve got to have the right individual picked out by “me” or “myself”. (So 
there’s an essential role here for acquaintance or indexicality after all, even 
if it’s a shallow role in Cappelen and Dever’s sense. That is, we can agree 
that indexicality isn’t playing an essential role in information-gathering, 
even if it is needed for other reasons.)8 
 
So in a lot of ways I agree with Cappelen and Dever. I agree that the 
Lewisian approach needs a more robust metaphysical account of self-
ascription (as opposed to some sort of deflationary or functionalist 
account). I agree that we need to spell out the de se in more metaphysical 
detail, and maybe this means we need special perspectival facts and a more 
permissive ontology. For anyone who wants to accommodate the structure 
of subjective experience in their metaphysics (and certainly as those who 
want to endorse richer temporal ontologies want to do), these are perfectly 
legitimate philosophical commitments to explore.9 
 
But I’m not in agreement with the idea that there is nothing of 
philosophical significance about the first personal perspective. There is still 
something deeply interesting about the nature of the first person, even if 
the parts played by indexicality and (a thin sense of) perspective are not 
doing much work. Arguments against the semantic theses of Lewis and 
Perry don’t show that there isn’t lots more to say about the issues in 
metaphysics and mind concerning the treatment of the self and how we 
might regard the de se. (There are also further things to say about the 
metaphysics, especially about metaphysical theories of personal identity 
and the self.)  
 
So I take Cappelen and Dever’s arguments to show that the action really is 
elsewhere. Indexicality isn’t distinctive. Nor is the thin sense of 
perspectivality. But the thick sense of perspectivality is important, and may 
well involve an irreducible mode of subjective presentation (or, if you 
                                                             
8 Ninan forthcoming. 
9 I don’t take any of this to be a direct objection to Cappelen and Dever. While I’m betting 
they’ll be skeptical of the kinds of moves I’m suggesting, they don’t argue directly against 
them in their book. 
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prefer, irreducibly perspectival facts). This makes perspective and the first 
person, as something in the world deeply related to the self and conscious 
experience, philosophically distinctive. Perhaps it isn’t especially distinctive 
with respect to the semantics, but with regard to the metaphysics and 
epistemology and the philosophy of mind, it is a philosophically deep and 
important topic. 
 
This feeds into questions about moral psychology and practical decision-
making. 
 
 
Imaginative Empathy and Self Understanding 
In this section, I’ll discuss two issues in moral psychology and epistemology 
where the epistemological importance of a grasp on one’s self and on the 
selves of others is important. The idea is to give some reasons for thinking 
there are philosophically interesting issues about the self that underwrite 
why we should care about the first personal perspective. 
 
Empathy 
One reason why it is important to develop the metaphysical and 
epistemological structure of the first personal perspective is because it can 
connect to interesting philosophical questions in moral psychology and 
social choice theory.  
 
A place where some of these interesting questions come up is the debate 
about empathy. One question about empathy concerns just what it is. We 
need to work out the metaphysical and epistemic structure of the state. 
There’s a fairly shallow interpretation of empathy as merely “feeling what 
another feels” without any substantive cognitive component. But we can 
identify a richer kind of empathy, what I’ll describe as “cognitive empathy”, 
where you perform a cognitive act that allows you to first personally 
represent some element of another person’s experience. The ability to 
represent in this way and draw on what is learned from such a 
representation has a normative role to play in moral assessment and 
decision-making, and is also routinely explored in the psychological 
literature.  
 
Cognitive empathy is often used to establish a basis for our tolerance or 
understanding of another's perspective.  
 
“… reflect on how you know that someone else’s physical pain is a bad 
thing. It may be that you know perfectly well what pain is, and know 
that some other people have it, but don’ t particularly see why that 
should concern you, even in cases where the other person is right there 
in front of you. You might find a guru or spiritual instructor who tells 
you, and occasionally reminds you, that you should be concerned 
about other people who’re feeling physical pain. But this is very 
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different to the usual case, in which an imaginative understanding of 
someone else’ s physical pain immediately drives a compassionate 
response to them. A compassionate response in the ordinary case has 
an authenticity that the externally driven response does not.” 
(Campbell 2015, p. 788). 
 
One of the strongest ways to motivate tolerance for alien points of view is 
to argue that you should "stand in the other person's shoes" or before you 
judge them you should "walk a mile in their shoes" etc. These kinds of 
cognitive acts involve the exercise of epistemic capacities where we 
understand or grasp certain possibilities or certain facts as part of 
imaginatively representing the different subjective perspectives of the 
individuals we are judging. (I suspect that empathy is just one member of a 
class of cognitive acts where we open up ourselves to a new perspective to 
grasp something previously epistemically alien to us.) 
 
To have the capacity for empathy seems to require a certain amount of 
shared experience, and to adopt an empathetic perspective one needs to try 
and view the world from the experienced perspective of the other. You 
don’t have to have had all the same experiences, but you have to somehow 
be able to “try on” the beliefs and attitudes of the person you are trying to 
empathize with. This act of “trying on” involves an experience where one 
attempts to experience or take on the perspective of the other, perhaps by 
attempting to partially cognitively model their perspective, or by 
attempting, in some properly attenuated sense, to grasp the belief or 
emotional structure of another through the lens of one’s own perspective.   
 
On the cognitive understanding of empathy, the empathetic task involves 
grasping some relevant feature of another person’s first personal 
perspective. This grasp is understood first personally: that is, you have 
another person’s first personal perspective, or some salient part of it, 
subjectively presented to you. You understand some dimension of what it is 
like to be that person, or how that person understands a given situation 
from her first personal perspective. This gives you a distinctive sort of 
understanding and the ability to make certain ethical and moral judgments. 
Note that there is no de se confusion here—it isn’t that you confuse another 
person’s first personal perspective or sense of self with your own. So 
whatever the act of grasping another’s first personal perspective involves, 
we should distinguish it from simply grasping de se content.  
 
Drawing on the discussion of modes of presentation I gave earlier, we can 
use the structure I developed for the first personal perspective to enrich our 
account of what empathy is. Using the ontologically minimal account 
where we employ subjective modes of presentation, we think of the first 
personal perspective as a distinctive subjective mode of presenting content, 
the de se mode of presentation. Now the (cognitively rich) way to 
understand empathy described above can be understood somewhat more 
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clearly, because we can better understand the structure of the empathetic 
task. 
 
When Zeus discovers that he is the god throwing down manna from the 
tallest mountain, he is presented with the content a God is throwing down 
manna from the tallest mountain in a distinctive, subjective way. Unusually 
for a God (and for Zeus in particular), Zeus is feeling empathetic, and so he 
also wants to understand what it is like for Hera to know that she is the God 
throwing down thunderbolts from the coldest mountain.10 If Zeus wants to 
know this, now he has a further, rather interesting task.  
 
On the model I sketched above, when Hera is de se subjectively presented 
with the content a God is throwing down thunderbolts from the coldest 
mountain (or she self-ascribes the relevant property) she knows that she is 
the God throwing down thunderbolts from the coldest mountain. What 
Zeus needs, then, is a mode of presentation that will embed Hera’s de se 
mode of presentation into his own, such that he first-personally grasps 
Hera’s first personal perspective, but he grasps it as Hera’s first personal 
perspective. 
 
So he needs to grasp a content in a complex way, namely, he needs to grasp 
a God is throwing down thunderbolts from the coldest mountain such that he 
(imaginatively) grasps what it is like for Hera to be de se subjectively 
presented with a God is throwing down thunderbolts from the coldest 
mountain, that is, he imaginatively grasps what it is like for Hera to know 
that she is the God throwing down thunderbolts from the coldest 
mountain. This sort of structure is interesting and complex. I doubt there is 
some sort of special semantic distinctiveness here. That’s not the point. The 
point is that we need to be clear about the cognitive structure of empathy 
and the embedded structure of subjective modes of presentation if we want 
to understand what empathy is.  
 
Empathy involves first personal understanding, and it is an important tool 
for moral understanding, moral motivation and moral assessment. I’m not 
arguing that empathy is somehow metaphysically necessary for morality. 
I’m arguing that it is often psychologically necessary for moral action, and 
also philosophically interesting: the structure of cognitive empathy involves 
an interesting way of embedding a representation of the first personal 
perspective of one individual into the first personal perspective of another.  
 
We can see the interest and importance of empathy and moral 
understanding in a range of philosophical discussions. For example, it’s the 
key to determining utility and preferences in social choice contexts, at least 
once we move past a simple behaviorist picture of revealed preferences. It 
connects to decision-making for others, to the extent that we rely on it to 
                                                             
10 I’m ignoring the fact that I’ve introduced a gender asymmetry in the example. Gods have 
complicated gender issues anyway. 
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determine their preferences when we make decisions for them. It’s pretty 
clearly the central task for Harsanyi, as we can see from his description of 
his influential social choice approach.  
 
“[T]he basic intellectual operation … is imaginative empathy. We 
imagine ourselves to be in the shoes of another person, and ask 
ourselves the question, ‘If I were now really in his position, and had his 
taste, his education, his social background, his cultural values, and his 
psychological makeup, then what now would now be my preferences 
between various alternatives.” [Harsanyi 1977, p. 638] 
 
There are many other ways an understanding of the first personal 
perspective connects to moral psychology. For example, in recent years 
there has been more interest in giving analyses of the nature of friendship, 
love, and sympathy. A philosophically rich treatment of these relationships 
must include a developed account of how first personal experience and 
perspective is built into the metaphysical structure of such relations. (My 
point here is that, while such relations are not merely phenomenological, 
they aren’t merely nonphenomenological either. Zombie love isn’t love as 
we’d ordinarily understand it. Understanding the role and importance of 
grasping the first personal perspective and experience of your loved one, 
and developing the structure of this complex psychological attitude, 
requires a model of how this works.) 
 
 
Self Understanding 
Another place where we need a rich model of the first personal perspective 
is when we try to understand first personal deliberation and decision-
making. Prospective reasoning, or reasoning about what we should do, 
based on what we desire and how we could act, is an extremely important 
cognitive task. Swathes of the psychological literature are devoted to it. 
 
Ordinarily, when making first-personal assessments of our preferences, we 
strike a balance between our first personal and third personal assessments 
of who we are, using memory and anticipation to represent ourselves over 
time and in different possible situations. Work in cognitive science suggests 
that performing this sort of cognitive task plays a central role in prospective 
reasoning. 
 
 “[These] combined observations suggest that the core network that 
supports remembering, prospection, theory of mind and related tasks 
is not shared by all tasks that require complex problem solving or 
imagination. Rather, the network seems to be specialized for, and 
actively engaged by, mental acts that require the projection of oneself 
into another time, place or perspective. Prospection and related forms 
of self-projection might enable mental simulations that involve the 
interactions of people, who have intentions and autonomous mental 
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states, by projecting our own mental states into different vantage 
points, in an analogous manner to how one projects oneself into the 
past and future.”11 
 
 
Further, prospective reasoning about our future selves under conditions of 
radical change suffers from a number of defects stemming from the role 
that experience plays in our ability to grasp what our future selves will be 
like, and the possibility of variation in the self that we are over time.12  
 
This brings out a need to develop the underlying metaphysics and 
philosophy of mind involved in the way we understand what a self is, and to 
better understand the way that first personal deliberation contributes to 
how we think of rational action and decision-making. 
 
We can relate this back to our earlier discussions of empathy and modes of 
presentation of a self. One way to frame the problem of lacking prospective 
access to your future self is to think of it as a problem with your capacity to 
imaginatively empathize with your (possible) future selves. This is a kind of 
understanding of our future selves that we value, and if we have to make big 
life decisions without it, we lose something of epistemic value. In some of 
these contexts, we value the first person perspective, even if we don’t 
strictly speaking need it, in order to make a rational decision about our 
future. 
 
It will be helpful to make this clearer using a somewhat roundabout 
approach discussing moral deference. The debate over moral deference 
involves the view that there is something problematic about an individual 
adopting a moral belief solely on the basis of what a moral expert tells him 
to do. The thought is that there is something wrong with an individual’s 
adopting a moral belief without judging and assessing the moral question 
himself, that is, there is something less than ideal with adopting a moral 
belief solely on the basis of the testimony of a moral expert. The sense of 
wrongness remains even if we assume the moral expert is in fact correct 
about the moral status of the belief. 
 
The background assumption is that the individual lacks the capacity to 
assess the moral value of an act or an event on his own. For some reason, 
the agent cannot introspectively arrive at the right moral beliefs. And the 
thought is that, ordinarily, even if a certain amount of moral instruction is 
appropriate, we want a moral agent to employ his own moral judgment to 
arrive at his moral beliefs. That is, an appropriate part of the process 
involved in arriving at a moral belief involves a certain sort of first-personal 
assessment that delivers moral understanding, and giving the believer 
                                                             
11 Buckner and Carroll (2006) “Self-projection and the brain”, Trends in Cognitive Sciences 
Vol.11 No.2, pp. 49-57. 
12 Paul 2014, Paul 2015b. 
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insight into why his moral belief is the right one to hold, or why the 
relevant action is right or wrong. The idea is that, even if one should adopt 
the correct moral beliefs, it is better, all things considered, for a believer to 
adopt this moral belief on the basis of his moral understanding rather than 
to adopt it merely on the basis of the testimony of the moral expert. 
 
Related issues arise with respect to intellectual deference and the virtue of 
understanding:  
 
“Even if the student can know that the professor’s judgment is true—
on the strength of his professorial authority—still if this is his evidence 
the student has not gained insight into why it is that that conclusion is 
true, or that the relevant action is wrong (or right).” (Enoch 2014, p. 9) 
 
Finally, we can see a parallel here to the agent who is choosing to act based 
on advice from the scientific expert.  Imagine you are faced with a big life 
choice, for example, the choice of whether to have a child. You have no idea 
what the best choice for you is: should you do it, or shouldn’t you? 
 
In this case, we assume you lack the capacity to discover or introspectively 
assess the value of the act on your own, and so you rely solely on the 
scientific expert for your beliefs about what you should do. So for this 
choice, you defer to the scientific expert, the sociologist or the psychologist. 
You make your decision of whether to have a child based solely on what 
he—the scientific expert—says you should do. This is what is ordinarily 
described as “blind deference”: you blindly defer to the scientific expert 
when you decide whether to become a parent. Let’s also assume that the 
scientific expert is in fact correct about what you should do, such that her 
advice corresponds to what would maximize your expected utility. Thus, we 
will treat her as a rational expert, and deference to her is rational deference. 
 
There seems to be something less-than-ideal about making the choice this 
way.13 But what is it? Even if we assume that the scientist really does know 
what’s best, there is something lost with rational deference. I suggest that, 
just as we think it is better for an individual to base her moral beliefs based 
on her moral understanding (perhaps with guidance from the moral 
expert), we expect an individual to base her life choices on her self 
understanding (perhaps with guidance from the rational expert).  
 
The point is not that deference to the scientist creates a problem for self 
knowledge. Just as moral deference can yield moral knowledge, rational 
deference can yield self knowledge.14 The point is that something important 
                                                             
13 Viz., Paul (2015a). Also see Jones 1999. 
14 There is an interesting connection here to a form of antirealism about rationality: I am 
assuming, with standard decision theory, the realist view that rationality concerns utility 
maximization. If we require rationality to require self understanding or self-construction, we 
can deny that the agent is acting rationally when she defers. The point is salient for the 
debate about rational deference as well as for the debate about moral deference. “In general, 
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is lost when one gains knowledge without understanding, which we can see 
by recognizing the loss when one merely has moral knowledge without 
moral understanding.15  
 
Some think that deference, in itself, is problematic. But I’m not assuming 
that deference is problematic, since there is value in getting ourselves to the 
truth. The idea, instead, is that the unsatisfactory nature of deference 
highlights the value of understanding. David Enoch makes a strong case in 
favor of moral deference, but even he does not claim that there is no cost 
associated with it.16 Rather, he argues that a need for moral deference gives 
us evidence that something else is lacking: there is a failure to achieve 
something of moral value.  
 
“This, then, is what is fishy about moral deference. It is not that it is 
unjustified as grounds for action—it is so justified, indeed, sometimes 
even required. It is not that it is epistemically unsound—here as 
elsewhere, expertise can ground knowledge, or help achieve any other 
epistemic status. It is that forming a moral judgment by deference and 
then acting on it is much less of a moral achievement than forming the 
true judgment without deference, because it does not constitute the 
appropriate response to the morally relevant features of the case.  
Moral deference indicates failure to achieve something we are 
expected to achieve.” (Enoch 2014, p. 27)  
 
It seems clear that what we are expected to achieve, but fail to achieve, in 
cases of moral deference, is moral understanding.17 If I understand why an 
act is morally right, I can use this understanding as a guide for future 
judgments, but I also exhibit a kind of moral virtue, because I have the 
capacity to understand why the act is morally right, that is, I grasp and 
employ the relevant reasons and can base my belief that it is right on these 
reasons.18 More generally, understanding is distinct from knowledge, and 
can be instrumentally as well as intrinsically valuable in its own right.19 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
the idea that one can understand a claim only if one independently grasps its justification 
conditions is a characteristic thesis of anti-realism; indeed, disagreement on this point is 
sometimes seen as definitive of the dispute between realist and anti-realist.” (McGrath 2011, 
p. 126.) Relatedly, if one thinks there are no facts about rationality, then the source of the 
problem with rational deference is that there are no facts about which one should be 
deferring. 
15 See Enoch 2014 and McGrath 2009.  
16 Sliwa 2012 defends the use of moral testimony to gain moral knowledge. 
17 As some of Richard Yetter Chappell’s remarks suggest, 
(http://www.philosophyetc.net/2013/10/testimony-and-moral-understanding.html) we could 
endorse moral testimony as an apt guide to moral knowledge even if we would not settle for 
moral knowledge without moral understanding. Also see Sliwa 2012. 
18 Hills 2009. 
19 Hills, Kvanvig, and Pritchard all contrast understanding with knowledge and hold that 
understanding is distinctively valuable. Kvanvig 2003 holds that understanding is distinctive 
and valuable, as does Pritchard REF  and Hills 2009. 
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We see exactly the same structure in cases of rational deference without 
self-understanding. Here, the virtues are epistemic as opposed to moral: 
there is epistemic virtue in acting rationally, and hence in deferring to the 
rational expert about what to do. But the need for rational deference arises 
because of a failure of a distinctive kind of achievement: a failure to achieve 
self-understanding. There is epistemic virtue in self-understanding. 20 
 
The distinctive problem, again, concerns the first personal perspective. That 
is, very briefly, the problem is that the agent cannot construct and represent 
her own first-personal causal model of how she’ll evolve in response to 
becoming a parent. She can’t imaginatively evolve her first-personal 
perspective forward under the proposed change, and as a result, she lacks a 
certain sort of epistemic capacity. 
 
If I lack the ability to prospectively represent and imagine the nature of the 
experience I’ll undergo, I cannot represent and imagine my responses and 
first personal changes as I respond to the experience, or imaginatively 
model my future point of view as it changes in response to the nature of the 
experience. Thus, I cannot project myself first personally into my future 
point of view. The future me, the person who I’ll become, is first-personally 
inaccessible to me now. 
 
Should I nevertheless defer to the rational expert when I choose? If 
rationality is the only epistemic goal here (or if being rational trumps my 
other epistemic goals) then I should defer. But in such a situation, there is a 
failure to achieve. When I defer to the rational expert to make my life 
choice, I am failing to exemplify virtues of self-knowledge and informed 
self-construction that I am describing as the epistemic virtues of self-
understanding. This is the virtue that we’d demonstrate if we chose with 
epistemic transparency.  
 
 
  
Conclusion 
Semantics alone isn’t going to do the work we might have wanted it to do in 
exploring the nature of the first personal perspective and the self. To 
understand the deeper questions about nature of the self involved in 
philosophical treatments of the de se, we need to talk more about the 
implicit metaphysical and epistemological commitments made in various 
discussions of the essential indexical. In this paper, I’ve started a 
conversation about how to draw on well-established work in the 
philosophy of mind on modes of presentation, and on metaphysical theses 
about abundant facts and properties, in order to undergird theories of the 
first person and the self. Such theories are important for the philosophical 
                                                             
20 This connects to the exchanges about using testimony without introspection to determine 
one’s preferences in Pettigrew (2015), Dougherty, Horowitz, and Sliwa (2015), and Paul 
(2015b, Paul 2015c) 
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work we want to do in many places, including work in moral psychology, 
metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophy of psychology.  
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